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Abstract
Starting from Becker’s seminal paper we review the ﬁrst contribu-
tions to the economics of crime, stressing how with the ﬁrst model
of criminal choice, due to Becker, the way of conceiving criminal be-
haviours has drastically changed. In fact, criminal choice ceases to be
viewed as determined by mental illness or bad attitudes, but it is con-
sidered on the basis of a maximization problem in which agents have
to compare costs and beneﬁts of legal and illegal activities taking in
account the probability of being arrested and punished and the ex-
pected returns from crime. Criminal decision is an economic choice by
rational agents. In the second part of the survey, in which we focus our
attention on empirical works, we present the main recent contributions
to the economics of crime; in particular we outline the determinants
of criminal behaviours and explore the relationships existing between
crime and socioeconomic variables emerging from the literature. In
fact, the economics of crime interacts with diﬀerent and heterogeneous
ﬁelds (i.e. sociology, criminology, psychiatry and geography). It is
closely related to poverty, social exclusion, wage and income inequality,
cultural and family background, level of education and other economic
and social factors that may aﬀect individual’s propensity to commit
crimes such as cultural characteristics, age and sex.
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employment; Youth
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
During the last three decades the economics of crime has become a new ﬁeld
for economics investigation, in particular due to the fact that over the same
period of time there has been an outstanding increase in criminal activities,
as conﬁrmed by several empirical studies.1
In 1968 Becker presents a paper that radically changes the way of think-
ing about criminal behaviour. Becker was anticipated by Fleisher, who in
1963 published a paper titled “The Eﬀect of Unemployment on Juvenile
Delinquency” in which he tried to explore the relationships existing be-
tween unemployment and youth crime. But it’s Becker’s paper to represent
a milestone for economic disciplines.
In fact, Fleisher’s work was merely an empirical study aiming at de-
tecting economic determinant of individual’s criminal behaviour. Becker
instead builds the ﬁrst model of criminal choice, stressing that “some indi-
viduals become criminals because of the ﬁnancial and other rewards from
crime compared to legal work, taking account of the likelihood of apprehen-
sion and conviction, and the severity of punishment” (p. 176).
Since the beginning of 80s, Becker’s paper opens the door to a new ﬁeld
of empirical research whose main purpose is to verify and study the economic
variables that determine criminal choices and behaviours of agents.
This has been possible because during the last two decades more rigorous
and systematic studies have been undertaken and especially a more system-
atic and speciﬁc methodology in collecting data very useful in analyzing this
social problem has been developed.
Given the high level of crime, it is not surprising that crime prevention
is a major economic activity. In fact, crime is a negative externality with
enormous social costs, hence it appears to be relevant that feasible and
eﬀective social and economic policies in tackling crime will be pursued and
undertaken; in doing so it is important to consider the social returns and
the net beneﬁts of those policies.
In particular, one of the aims of the economist is to design and to explore
eﬀective policies, not only to identify the economic and social determinants
of crime. The economic analysis has to support policy makers in pursuing
and implementing the correct and adequate policies in reducing crime. In
order to do this it is required to outline the determinants of criminal be-
haviours and explore the relationships existing between social and economic
variables.
1Fajnzylber et al., (2002, 2002); Freeman, (1991, 1996 and 1999); Glaeser, (1999).
2In fact, the economics of crime interacts with diﬀerent and heterogeneous
ﬁelds (i.e. sociology, criminology, psychiatry and geography). It is closely
related to poverty, social exclusion, wage and income inequality, cultural
and family background, level of education and other economic and social
factors that may aﬀect individual’s propensity to commit crimes such as
cultural characteristics (i.e. religion and colonial heritage),2 age and sex
(i.e. young males are said to be more prone to violence than the rest of the
population),3 the availability of ﬁre arms in the countries and the existence
of illegal drug-related activities.4
Since Becker’s (1968) seminal paper, economists have increasingly stud-
ied the determinants and consequences of crime.
The aim of this survey is to discuss the outstanding contribution pro-
duced, in doing this we present both theoretical and empirical papers.
In the ﬁrst paragraph of this paper we discuss the theoretical papers and
the theoretical models from which the economics of crime has started.
In analyzing and presenting the empirical works on crime we focus our
attention on the determinants of crime and in particular on the relation-
ships existing between wage inequality, income redistribution, education,
age, unemployment and crime.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present an historical
overview discussing the ﬁrst contributions to the economics of crime.5 Sec-
tion 3 examines the literature about crime and labour market, focusing on
the role of unemployment and labour opportunities.
In Section 4 we present recent contributions relative to crime and inequal-
ity, while in Section 5 we discuss theoretical and empirical works about crime
and youth. Section 6 examines the role of education in criminal behaviour,
while Section 7 examines literature on social exclusion (racial discrimination,
peer eﬀects, gender), social interactions and crime. Section 8 concludes.
2 An Overview of the Early Literature on Crime
The ﬁrst economist that treated crime from an economic perspective was
Fleisher.
In 1963, Fleisher stressed the importance of “understand(ing) the rela-
tionship between delinquency and labour market condition...from the point
2Fajnzylber, Lederman, and Loayza (2002).
3Among the others Freeman (1991) and Grogger (1998).
4Levitt and Venkatesh (1998).
5Fleisher, (1963, 1966); Becker, (1968); Sjoquist, (1973); Ehrlich (1975); Block and
Heineke, (1975).
3of view of public policy” and furthermore focused his attention on “other
aspects of the functioning of the labour market, such as the determination
of levels and distributions of wages and the determination of population dis-
tribution” that “may well have important eﬀects upon the allocation of time
among legitimate and illegitimate forms of activity” (p. 543).
Fleisher comes to the conclusion that “an examination of delinquency
rate and other variables by age and through time suggests that the eﬀect of
unemployment on juvenile delinquency is positive and signiﬁcant. However,
this statement is easier to support when it refers to individual who are over
sixteen years of age” (pp. 553-554).6
Furthermore, Fleisher (1966) was a pioneer in studying the role of in-
come on the decision to commit criminal acts by individuals, and stated that
“the principal theoretical reason for believing that low income increases the
tendency to commit crime is that it raises the relative cost of engaging in
legitimate activity” and that “the probable cost of getting caught is rela-
tively low, since they (low-income individuals) view their legitimate lifetime
earning prospects dismally they may expect to lose relatively little earning
potential by acquiring criminal records; furthermore, if legitimate earnings
are low, the opportunity cost of time actually spent in delinquent activity,
or in jail, is also low” (Fleisher 1966, p. 120). However, the level of legal in-
come expected by an individual is not the only relevant ‘income’ factor; the
income level of potential victims also matters. The higher the level of income
of potential victims, the higher the incentive to commit crimes, especially
crimes against property. Thus, according to Fleisher (1966, p. 121), “(aver-
age) income has two conceptual inﬂuences on delinquency which operate in
opposite directions, although they are not necessarily equal in strength.”
Fleisher’s (1966, pp. 128-129) econometric results showed that higher
average family incomes across 101 U.S. cities in 1960 were actually associated
with lower court appearances by young males, and with lower numbers of
arrests of young males for the crimes of robbery, burglary, larceny, and auto
theft.
The author also found that the diﬀerence between the average income of
the second lowest quartile and the highest quartile of households tended to
increase city arrest and court-appearance rates, but the coeﬃcient was small
in magnitude, and became statistically insigniﬁcant when the regressions
were run for high-income communities alone.
6Following and recent studies (i.e. Grogger 1995 and 1998) have conﬁrmed that in
particular young men between 16 and 30 years of age are more prone to violence and to
commit crime.
4The two papers of Fleisher represent a ﬁrst attempt to analyze from
an economic point of view the relationship between crime and economic and
social variables, but it was Becker (1968) in his seminal work on the economic
analysis of criminal behaviour to represent the starting point for analyzing
society’s choice of crime control policies in the context of an economic model.
In fact Becker stressed that “crime is an economically important activity
or ‘industry’...almosttotalneglectedbyeconomists”(p. 170).
In his Nobel lecture, Becker (1993, p. 390) emphasizes that while “in
the 1950s and 1960s, intellectual discussions of crime were dominated by the
opinion that criminal behaviour was caused by mental illness and social op-
pressions, and that criminals were helpless victims” the economics approach
“implie(s) that some individuals become criminals because of the ﬁnancial
and other rewards from crime compared to legal work, taking account of the
likelihood of apprehension and conviction, and the severity of punishment.”
Becker proposes a framework where an individual rationally decides
whether to engage in criminal activities by comparing the expected returns
to crime with the returns to legitimate market opportunities.
We here quickly review the basic Becker’s model where individuals decide
whether or not to commit crimes, in other words individuals decide how
to allocate time between legitimate and illegitimate activities, basing their
decision on a cost-beneﬁt analysis.
“The approach taken” in his analysis “follows the economist’ usual anal-
ysis of choice and assumes that a person commits an oﬀence if the expected
utility to him exceeds the utility he could get by using his time and other
resources at other activities. Some persons become ‘criminals’, therefore,
not because their basic motivation diﬀers from that of other persons, but
because their beneﬁts and costs diﬀer” (p. 176).
Hence, Becker deﬁnes a supply of oﬀences (O) which related “the number
of oﬀences by any person to his probability of conviction (p), to his punish-
ment if convicted (f) and a portmanteau variable (u), such as the income
available to him in legal and other illegal activities” (p. 177):
Oj = Oj(pj,f j,u j)
The agent’s choice is made under uncertainty, then the utility expected
from committing a crime is deﬁned, by Becker, as:
EUj = pjUj(Yj − fj)+( 1− pj)Uj(Yj)
where Yj “is his income, monetary plus psychic” (p. 177), from commit-
ting a crime, furthermore expected utility is also determined by the proba-
5bility of success (1 − pj)and by “the monetary equivalent of the punishment”
fj. The supply of crime is decreasing in p and f.
“The main contribution of this essay is to demonstrate that optimal
policies to combat illegal behaviour are part of an optimal allocation of re-
sources” (p. 209), hence “optimal decisions are interpreted to mean decisions
that minimize the social loss in income from oﬀenses” (p. 207).
Becker deﬁnes the social loss function from oﬀences as:
L = D(O)+C(p,O)+bfpO
where D is damage from crime, C cost of apprehension and conviction
and bfpO is the total social loss from punishments.
Social policy variables are represented by p (probability of arrest) and
f (punishment). Minimizing with respect to p and f and solving the model
Becker obtains important implications on agents propensity toward risk.7
Crime reduction can occur through reducing the beneﬁts of crime or
raising the probability of being caught or the costs of punishment conditional
upon being caught. Also “a rise in the income available in legal activities
or an increase in law-abidingness due, say, to ‘education’ would reduce the
incentive to enter illegal activities and thus reduce the number of oﬀenses”
(p. 177).
This is conﬁrmed by U.S. data (see Grogger, 1991): increases in the
probability of arrest tend to be more eﬀective than increases in the time
spent in prison. In principle, this might occur because criminals are not risk
neutral or because criminals are very impatient. Finally, in this model the
role of arrest and punishment comes exclusively through deterrence. If these
factors are operating through incapacitation (i.e. locking up particularly
dangerous people), then the probability of arrest and the size of punishment
might not have equivalent eﬀects.8
7“The loss from oﬀenses is minimized if p and f are selected from those regions where
oﬀenders are, on balance, risk preferrers. Although only the attitudes oﬀenders have
toward risk can directly determine whether “crime pays”, rational public policy indirectly
insures that “crime does not pay” through its choice of p and f” (p. 183).
“An increase in p “compensated by an equal percentage reduction in f would not change
the expected income from an oﬀense but could change the expected utility, because the
amount of risk would change. It is easily shown that an increase in p would reduce the
expected utility, and thus the number of oﬀenses, more than an equal percentage increase
in f, if agent has preference for risk; the increase in f would have the greater eﬀect if he
has aversion to risk; and they would have the same eﬀect if he is risk neutral.” (p. 178)
8“Shift in the form of the punishment, from a ﬁne to imprisonment, would tend to
reduce the number of oﬀenses, at least temporarily, because they cannot be committed
while in prison” (p. 178).
6Ehrlich (1973) extends the analysis made by Becker, considering how
income levels and distribution may aﬀect criminal propensity and crime
rate. He argues that payoﬀs to crime, especially property crime, depend
primarily on the “opportunities provided by potential victims of crime”.
The author assumes that, “the mean legitimate opportunities available
to potential oﬀenders” may be approximated by “the mean income level of
those below the state’s median (income)” (p. 539). For a given median
income, income inequality can be an indicator of the diﬀerential between
the payoﬀs of legal and illegal activities. In his econometric analysis of
the determinants of state crime rates in the U.S. in 1960, Ehrlich (1973)
ﬁnds that higher median family incomes were associated with higher rates
of murder, rape, and assault, and with higher rates of property crimes, such
as burglary. In addition, a measure of income inequality - the percentage
of families below one-half of the median income - was also associated with
higher crime rates. The former ﬁnding contradicts Fleisher (1966), but the
latter ﬁnding on the role of income inequality supports Fleisher’s ﬁndings
that inequality is associated with higher crime rates.
Both Fleisher (1966) and Ehrlich (1973) considered the eﬀect of unem-
ployment on crime rates, viewing the unemployment rate in a community
as a complementary indicator of income opportunities available in the legal
labour market.
In their empirical studies, however, both authors ﬁnd that unemployment
rates were less important determinants of crime rates than income levels
and distribution, as conﬁrmed in following and recent papers (i.e. Grogger,
Freeman, 1994; Imrohoroglu et. al, 2000).
Another important factor related to the eﬀect of economic conditions on
crime is the level of education in the population, which can determine the
expected rewards from both legal and criminal activities.
In fact, Usher (1997) has argued that education may also have a ‘civi-
lization’ eﬀect, tending to reduce the incidence of criminal activity.
However, after controlling for income inequality and median income,
Ehrlich (1975, p. 333) found a positive and signiﬁcant relationship between
the average number of school years completed by the adult population (over
25 years) and particularly property crimes committed across the U.S. in
1960. The author provided four possible explanations of this puzzling em-
pirical ﬁnding. First, it is possible that education may raise the marginal
product of labour in the crime industry to a greater extent than for legit-
imate economic pursuits (Ehrlich, 1975, p. 319). Second, higher average
levels of education may be associated with less under-reporting of crimes
(Ehrlich, 1975, p. 333). Third, it is possible that education indicators act
7as a “surrogate for the average permanent income in the population, thus
reﬂecting potential gains to be had from crime, especially property crimes”
(Ehrlich 1975, p. 333). Finally, combined with the observation that income
inequality raises crime rates, it is possible to infer that certain crime rates
are “directly related to inequalities ins c h o o l i n ga n do n - t h e - j o bt r a i n i n g ”
(Ehrlich, 1975, p. 335).
Together with the relationship between economic conditions and crime,
one of the main issues in the pioneering studies by Becker (1968) and Ehrlich
(1973, 1975, 1996) is the assessment of the eﬀects of police presence, con-
victions, and the severity of punishment on the level of criminal activity.
Individuals who are considering whether to commit crimes are assumed to
evaluate both the risk of being caught and the associated punishment. The
empirical evidence from the United States conﬁrmed that both factors have
a negative eﬀect on crime rates.9
However a distinction is often made between the ‘deterrence’ eﬀects of
policing and convictions and the ‘incapacitation’ eﬀect of locking-up crim-
inals who may have a tendency to rejoin the crime industry once they are
released.
As stated by Ehrlich (1981, p. 311), “deterrence essentially aims at
modifying the ‘price of crime’ for all oﬀenders,” while incapacitation — and
for that matter, rehabilitation — acts through the removal of “a subset of
convicted oﬀenders from the market for oﬀences either by relocating them
in legitimate labour markets, or by excluding them from the social scene
for prescribed periods of time.” The author shows that the eﬀectiveness
of rehabilitation and incapacitation depends on the rate of recidivism of
oﬀenders, and on their responsiveness to economic incentives.
Since most forms of punishment that incapacitate oﬀenders also involve
deterrent eﬀects it is often diﬃcult to evaluate empirically the importance
of each type of action. Using estimates based on regression results for the
U.S. in 1960, Ehrlich (1981) concluded that “in practice the overwhelming
p o r t i o no ft h et o t a lp r e v e n t i v ee ﬀect of imprisonment is attributable to its
pure deterrent eﬀect.”
Another important consideration for assessing the eﬀectiveness of deter-
rence is the individual’s attitude towards risk, because in maximizing his
expected utility from illegal income an agent will be aﬀected by his risk
aversion. Becker (1968, p. 178) and Ehrlich (1973, p. 528), for example,
establish, in their theoretical analysis, that a risk-neutral oﬀender would
tend to spend more time in criminal activity than a risk-averse individual.
9See Ehrlich (1973, p. 545, and 1996, p. 55).
8Another implication of assuming risk-aversion is that raising the probability
of conviction may have a greater deterrent eﬀect than raising the severity of
punishment (Becker 1968, p. 178).
David Sjoquist (1973) follows the approach used by Fleisher and Becker.
The basic idea, as in Becker’s papers, of this interesting work, is that “un-
der some conditions, criminals can be treated as rational economic beings,
assumed to behave in the same economic manners as any other individual
making an economic decision under risk”. In Sjoquist’s model, agents, given
a ﬁxed amount of time, must choose how to allocate their time between
legal and illegal activities. Psychic and ﬁnancial costs and gains depend on
participation in the two activities. Psychic and ﬁnancial costs associated
with illegal activities result from arrest, conviction and punishment. Using
a Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function agents have to maximize their
expected utility function subject to the time constraint.
Very interesting is the econometric part of Sjoquist’s work. He tested
his theoretical model using a cross-sectional sample of 53 municipalities of
the United States with 1960 population of 25,000 to 200,000. From the
econometric estimates it results that an increase in the ratio of arrests to
the number of crime reduces the amount of crime because it increases the
expected costs and therefore reduces the expected utility from crime (as
previously analyzed in the Becker’s model). Furthermore Sjoquist’s analysis
consent to show that it exists a positive eﬀect of unemployment on property
crime, even if this result is not conﬁrmed in following and recent studies
(Freeman, 1994 and Imrohoroglu et al., 2001).
Finally, an interesting and original work is represented by the paper of
Block and Heineke (1975), the authors present an alternative formulation
of the criminal choice problem. They follow the theoretical framework used
by Becker, Ehrlich and Sjoquist even if in the introduction of their work
they state that “in particular, Becker, Isaac Ehrlich, and David Sjoquist
summarize the consequences of time-consuming illegal activities in terms
of a distribution of wealth alone without fully considering the underlying
multiattribute choice problem”. Furthermore they “show that by not fully
specifying their choice problems, and therefore the transformation between
what is inherently a multiattribute decision problem and the wealth-only
problem” the three authors mentioned above “are led to conclusions which
are valid only in very special cases” (p. 314).
The main critique by Block and Heineke to previous papers is related to
the deﬁnition of crime behaviour as a ‘wealth-only’ problem. The authors
introduce time spent in legal and illegal activities in the utility function of
their model, diﬀerentiating from Becker, Ehrlich and Sjoquist that consid-
9ered time allocation only implicitly through its eﬀects on wealth.10
The approach followed by Block and Heineke tends to be more gen-
eral and more complete with respect to the previous analysis conducted by
Becker and Ehrlich. The two authors try to generalize the previous eco-
nomic models of crime (ECMs) in order to be able to obtain results valid
not only in very special cases. “Most signiﬁcantly, changes in (i) wealth, (ii)
the payoﬀ to illegal activity, (iii) enforcement, (iv) punishment, and (v) the
degree of certainty surrounding punishment were seen to have no qualitative
supply implications under traditional preference restrictions” (p. 323).
The papers discussed and presented in this section represent the theoret-
ical basis of the economic of crime and demonstrated the tentative to study
crime from an economic point of view.
In particular they permit to deduce that any criminal behaviour is in-
ﬂuenced by some speciﬁc factors:
• diﬀerential wages between legal and illegal activities,
• income level,
• probability of arrest and probability of punishment,
• level of education.
Criminal choice is not determined by mental illness or bad attitudes, but
it is made on the basis of a maximization problem in which agents have to
compare costs and beneﬁts of legal and illegal activities taking in account the
probability of being arrested and punished and the expected returns from
crime. Criminal decision is determined by an economic analysis of agents.
In this ﬁrst paragraph of the survey we have presented the most impor-
tant contribution to the economics of crime. In particular, starting from
the ﬁrst paper of Fleisher and from the seminal paper of Becker, we present
and discuss the main theoretical and empirical papers produced until the
late ‘70s. We review the literature with the aim of stressing the theoretical
10As stressed by Witte (1980), “The major attack on Ehrlich’s model and results come
in a paper by Block and Heineke. They show that if the time allocated to legal and illegal
activity is introduced explicitly into the utility function, no comparative static results
are forthcoming under traditional preference restrictions, This is true because increasing
(decreasing) the relative return to an activity will cause a wealth as well as a substitution
eﬀect. Restrictions that allow the wealth eﬀects to be signed are necessary for unambiguous
r e s u l t st ob ef o r t h c o m i n g .S p e c i ﬁcally, they show that Ehrlich’s comparative static results
are forthcoming only if psychic and ethical costs emanating from time allocation decision
are independent of wealth” (p. 59).
10framework of economics of crime. In particular, we propose the milestone
represented by Becker’s seminal paper and the following contribution and
extension of Becker’s original idea (Ehrlich, Block and Heineke). Our re-
view of the origins of economics of crime is completed by presenting the ﬁrst
econometric contributions due to Fleisher, Sjoquist and Ehrlich, in which the
authors test empirically the theoretical models. There are some diﬀerences
between econometric and theoretical results (i.e. the role of unemployment),
but we can state that the theoretical framework is robust to the empirical
tests.
3 Crime and Unemployment
The existence of a relationship between crime and unemployment is ambigu-
ous, both in its nature and in its robustness. Since the ﬁrst contributions
to the economics of crime it has been try to identify if exist a relationship
between crime and unemployment.11 In particular many works have focused
their attention only on unemployment, neglecting other relevant components
of the labour market as wages and employment opportunities. Furthermore,
it is believed that most of criminals are unemployed, while, as showed by
several studies,12 the majority of people who decide to engage in criminal ac-
tivities are employed. Thus, we focus on these aspects trying to give a wider
perspective of the relationship existing between crime and unemployment.
Using Freeman’s (1994) words we can state that “the question that tradi-
tionally motivated analyses of crime and the job market has been the eﬀect
of unemployment on crime. Many people believe that joblessness is the
key determinant of crime, and have sought to establish a signiﬁcant crime-
unemployment trade-oﬀ. Studies through the mid 1980s found that higher
unemployment was associated with greater occurrence of crime, though the
unemployment-crime link was statistically looser than the link between mea-
sure of deterrence and crime...Most important, although the rate of unem-
ployment drifted upwards from the 1950s to the 1990s, even the largest es-
timated eﬀects of unemployment on crime suggest that it contributed little
to the rising trend in crime” (p. 1).
This sceptical opinion by Freeman is conﬁrmed by the fact that “since
the late ‘70s, many social scientists have concluded that the unemployment-
crime relationship, measured at aggregate level, is both inconsistent and
insigniﬁcant” (Chiricos, 1987) (p. 188).
11Fleisher (1963, 1966), Ehrlich (1973).
12Freeman, (1994); Imrohoroglu et al.(2001).
11Recently, a clarifying and complete review of the many theoretical and
empirical models addressing the issue of the relationships between unem-
ployment and crime has been produced by Masciandaro (1999).
Our aim is not to reproduce Masciandaro’s survey, but to focus our at-
tention on the very recent contributions to the debate on the relationship
between unemployment and crime. In particular, we are interested in stress-
ing how most people engage in crime are employed and that unemployment
alone is not a relevant determinant to crime. In this sense we need to ac-
count for wage rate and employment opportunities in order to analyze the
role of the labour market on crime.
From our point of view very interesting and relevant are the results
obtained by Imrohoroglu, Merlo and Rupert (2001). Their “model predicts
that about 79% of the people engaging in criminal activities are employed
and only the remaining 21% are unemployed”, this is consistent with the
U.S. 1980 data. Furthermore, “the decrease in the unemployment rate does
not seem to have any impact on the crime rate. This ﬁnding is mostly due
to” the fact that “even though the overall unemployment rate is lower in
1996 as opposed to 1980, youth unemployment rates were actually higher in
1996” and “the overwhelming majority of criminals are employed”.
Then, it is important to decomposed the eﬀect of labour market on crim-
inal activities. In fact, it is important to distinguish between overall unem-
ployment rate and youth unemployment rate. Furthermore, it is important
to distinguish between labour market opportunities and employment.
As stressed by Gould, Weinberg and Mustard (2002), “previous works
on the relationship between labor markets and crime focused mainly on the
relationship between unemployment rate and crime, and found inconclusive
results. In contrast” it is important to “examine the impact of both wages
and unemployment on crime, and use instrumental variables to establish
causality”.
The same approach has been used by Witt et. al (1998) in their empirical
investigation for England and Wales. Their empirical results suggest “that
continued falls in the relative wages of unskilled men and increases in male
unemployment in England and Wales act as incentives to engage in criminal
activity.”
We brieﬂy mention, as did by Freeman (1994) and Masciandaro (1999),
that “social science analyses of the eﬀect of the labor market on crime take
several forms: time series studies that compare the crime rate to labor
market variable over time; cross-section area studies that compare crime
and economic characteristics across people” (Freeman, 1994, p. 8).
Depending on the type of study conducted is likely to obtain diﬀerent
12results and speciﬁcally the time series are not a robust way to determine the
job market/crime link. Cross-section area studies are free from collinearity
or serial correlation, but they suﬀer from their own set of inference problem.
Even this kind of studies ﬁnd positive link between crime and unemployment,
but “there is enough statistical frailty in extant estimate to leave a door open
to doubt” (Freeman, 1994, p. 15).
The relationship existing between crime and unemployment is not clear
and unambiguous, and appears to be very sensitive to econometric speciﬁ-
cation.
4 Crime and Inequality
Income inequality is likely to be one of the major causes of crime. As dis-
cussed above,13 criminal activities are determined by economic motivations
and a very important and relevant aspect is represented by the distribution
of income across workers and more in general across society. An outstanding
number of papers deal with this topic and in recent years interesting and
valid works have been written about the relationships between inequality
and crime.14
Over the past 30 years15 wage inequality has considerably increased and
over the same period there has been a striking increase in crime rate.
Our aim is to examine whether this two factors — crime and inequality
— are linked, but in doing this we have to distinguish carefully the eﬀects of
inequality from those of poverty.
We can distinguish among many eﬀects of inequality on crime. Follow-
ing Kelly (2000) we can state that “in the economics theory of crime, areas
of high inequality place poor individuals who have low returns from mar-
ket activity next to high-income individuals who have goods worth taking,
thereby increasing the returns to time allocated to criminal activity” fur-
thermore “strain theory argues that, when faced with the relative success of
others around them, unsuccessful individuals feel frustration at their situa-
tion. The greater the inequality, the higher this strain and the greater the
inducement for low-status individuals to commit crime”.
Basically we can diﬀerentiate between two causes: one purely economic
and one psychological, more speciﬁc a l l yi ti sp o s s i b l et oa r g u et h a tt h ee f -
13Fleisher (1966), Ehrlich (1973).
14Chiu and Madden (1998); Burdett et. al (1999); Imrohoroglu et al. (2000, 2001);
Kelly (2000); Fajnzylber et al. (2002); Burdett and Mortensen, (1998).
15Juhn, Murphy and Pierce (1993).
13fect of income or wage inequality in society will depend on the individual’s
relative income position. It is likely that in the case of the rich, an increase
in inequality will not induce them to commit more crimes. However, in the
case of the poor, an increase in inequality may be crime inducing, because
such an increase implies a larger gap between the poor’s wages and those of
the rich, thus reﬂecting a larger diﬀerence between the income from crimi-
nal and legal activities. A rise in inequality may also have a crime-inducing
eﬀect by reducing the individual’s moral threshold through what we could
call an “envy eﬀect”.
Therefore, a rise inequality will have a positive impact on (at least some)
individuals’ propensity to commit a crime. The following logical step is to
identify which are the causes that determine inequality.
Juhn, Murphy and Pierce (1993), analyze the relationship between wage
inequality and the rise in returns to skill in the U.S.. Then, they show that
between 1963 and 1989 the average weekly wage of working men increased
by about 20 %, but these real gains were not spread equally across workers.
Wages for the least skilled, measured by the tenth percentile of the wage
distribution, fell by about 5 %, while wages for the most skilled, measured
by the ninetieth percentile of the wage distribution, increased by about 40
percent.
According to Katz and Murphy (1992) over the same period of time
(1963-1987) the U.S. experienced an increase in wage diﬀerentials, due in
particularly to a sharp increase in the relative earnings of college graduates.
They are able to verify that average wages of older workers increased relative
to the wages of younger workers.
Katz and Murphy (1992) suggest that the change in relative wages is
partly due to the growth in the demand for more educated workers.
A very similar results is obtained by Juhn, Murphy and Pierce (1993),
in fact looking within education and experience categories a more striking
change in wage inequality is revealed.
These two papers suggest that over the past 30 years there has been
an enormous increase in wage inequality and in particular the change has
regarded young and unskilled workers.
This outstanding increase in wage inequality is one of the major causes
of increased criminal behaviour according to several authors.16
In the remaining part of this section we will try to give an exhaustive
overview of economic contribution with respect to this topic.
Burdett, Lagos and Wright (1999) build a dynamic model for the labour
16Freeman (1994); Grogger (1998); Imrohoroglu et al. (2000, 2001).
14market in which agents decide whether or not to commit property crime.
The basic framework of this model is a generalization of Burdett and Mortensen
(1998), where ﬁr m ss e tw a g e sa n dw o r k e r sr a n d o m l ys e a r c hf o rﬁrms. On-
the-job search is allowed, so the equilibrium is characterized by a non-
degenerate distribution of wages. Periodically, each worker faces an op-
portunity to enter crime activities and make a choice about it by weighting
the expected cost and beneﬁt. Agent’s decision depends on the state of the
labour market, the probability of being apprehended and convicted, and the
severity of the punishment (i.e. ﬁnes and jail).
Several empirical studies have showed a positive relationship between
inequality, unemployment and crime. This could mean that labour-market
policies that are able to reduce unemployment and inequality may also be
used to discourage crime. Burdett, Lagos and Wright discuss this hypothe-
sis using their model and in particular, they study the interactions between
unemployment, the degree of income inequality and crime rate, all of which
are endogenously determined in the model.17 Furthermore, they analyze
the eﬀects of several policies designed to combat crime. The model presents
four diﬀerent types of equilibria. In the ﬁrst case both employed workers and
unemployed agents engage in crime. In the second case employed agents do
not commit crime, while unemployed agents do. In the third case both em-
ployed workers and unemployed agents engage in criminal activity. Finally,
in the fourth case there are two types of employed workers and with respect
to their wage level they decide whether to engage crime. In particular, this
last equilibrium permits to state that “while some workers are employed in
high-paying jobs and remain honest, others work for ﬁrms that pay less than
the crime wage and hence choose to become criminals” (p. 13).
An important study has been conducted by Imrohoroglu, Merlo and
Rupert (2000). They present a general equilibrium model in which hetero-
geneous agents specialize either in legal activities or in illegal (or criminal)
activities, and majority rule determines the share of income redistributed
and the expenditures devoted to the apprehension of criminals. They cal-
ibrate their model to the U.S. economy in 1990, and conduct simulation
exercises to assess the eﬀectiveness of expenditures on police protection and
income redistribution at reducing crime.
Their results can be summarized as follows. Expenditures devoted to
police protection reduce crime, while the crime rate may increase with in-
come redistribution. These results appear counter-intuitive and it depends
17“ T h e r ew i l lb eac r i t i c a lw a g ew *s u c ht h a ta g e n t sc o m m i tc r i m e si fa n do n l yi fw<
w*”, (p. 4).
15speciﬁcally on the characteristics of the wage distribution the authors adopt
a n do nt h ee ﬃciency of the apprehension technology. In fact, economies
which adopt relatively more generous redistribution policies may have ei-
ther higher or lower crime rate than economies with relatively less generous
redistribution policies.
In particular, they show that in an environment where it is not possi-
ble to detect criminals and non-criminals as recipient of transfer payment,
increasing government subsidies may increase the crime rate because of the
distortionary eﬀects of the higher taxes necessary to ﬁnance the subsidy.
In their following paper, Imrohoroglu, Merlo and Rupert (2001) propose
a dynamic equilibrium model and they analyze recent trends in aggregate
property crime rates in the United States.
In fact, during the last decade crime rate has sharply and steadily de-
clined. The authors’ aim is to identify which economic and social factors
are responsible of this decline.
As already suggested by Grogger (1998) and Freeman (1994), most of the
crimes in the U.S. as in European countries are committed by youths,18 then
the demographic factor appears to be strongly related to criminal activity
and thus to crime patterns. In fact, over the last decade the fraction of
youths in the U.S. population has decreased from 20.5% in 1980 to 15.1%
in 1996.
Another important factor that may alter incentives to commit crime and
then reduce (or increase) crime rate is law enforcement. Police expenditures
“have increased from 0.6% of GDP in 1980 to 0.7% of GDP in 1996” (p. 1).
Other relevant phenomena have been taking place in the 1990s. In partic-
ular, changes in the structure of earnings, employment opportunities, and
the skill composition of the work force are likely to be closely related to
c h a n g e si nt h el e v e lo fc r i m i n a la c t i v i t y .
All these observations seem to go in a direction of a reduction in crime.
Real earnings have been increasing, at the same time, aggregate unemploy-
ment has been decreasing and so has the fraction of unskilled individuals in
the labour force.
The change in other variables, however, seems to point in the opposite
direction. Income inequality has been increasing. In addition, youth unem-
ployment has been increasing.
Calibrating their model using U.S. data for 1980, Imrohoroglu, Merlo
and Rupert (2001) are able to reproduce the drop in crime. Second, they
18It does not exist a precise deﬁnition for young people, but generally youth include
people aged from 14 to 25.
16identify factors that account for the observed decline in property crime:
higher apprehension probability, stronger economy, and aging of population.
Third, they conclude that the eﬀect of unemployment on crime is negligible.
Fourth, inequality represent an important factor in determining the level
of crime. In fact, holding everything else constant, the increase in income
inequality between 1980 and 1996 would have caused a substantial increase
in property crime.
In both their models, the authors allow also employed workers to engage
in crime. In fact, data showed how more than 75% of criminals are employed
workers and this basically exclude unemployment as one of the major causes
of criminal behaviour.
Chiu and Madden (1998) investigate the relationship between the level
of crime and the distribution of income. They show that the number of
burglaries increases as the income distribution becomes more unequal. This
paper provides a theoretical explanation for a relationship between income
inequality and property crime, which has been empirically established.19 In
particular, increases in relative diﬀerential inequality increase the level of
crime. Moreover, “increases in income tax progressivity reduce the crime
rate”. It is worth to notice that according Chiu and Madden model “richer
neighbourhoods may have lower crime rates than poorer neighbourhoods
because they may have a lower relative diﬀerential income inequality or be-
cause the richest households in the richer neighbourhoods adopt an eﬀective
defence technology against burglary” (p. 135).
Kelly (2000) analyses whether high inequality and high rates of crime,
particularly of violent crime, are linked. As the author states (p. 537) “In
assessing the social costs of inequality, the economics literature has tended to
consider its long-run costs: lower economic growth (Persson and Tabellini,
1994) and reduced human capital formation (Benabou, 1996; Durlauf, 1996;
Kremer, 1997)” while “this paper investigated a much more immediate cost
of inequality: its impact on crime”.
In his empirical analysis, using data taken from the 1991 FBI Uniform
Crime Reports, Kelly shows that for violent crimes the impact of inequality
is large, even after controlling for the eﬀects of poverty, race, and family com-
position. Although most crimes are committed by the most disadvantaged
members of society, these individuals face greater pressure and incentives to
commit crime in areas of high inequality.
19Imrohologlu et al. (2000, 2001); Grogger (1998); Freeman (1994).
175C r i m e a n d E d u c a t i o n
Crime appears to be strictly related to the level of education attained and
to individuals’ economic and social background.
Several studies have shown that criminals tend to be less educated and
from poorer economic backgrounds than non criminals.20 Thus, identifying
low education as a determinant of criminal behaviour would allow us to de-
sign eﬀective and proper policies aiming at increasing the level of education
and schooling in order to reduce crime rate. This topics is closely linked to
other aspects that determine and inﬂuence crime rate such as age and in-
equality. In fact, agents decide their educational demand in their youth and
in doing this they are inﬂuenced by their social and economic background
and by the level of education of their parents (i.e. a sort of “peer eﬀect”).
As previously asserted, some studies address this topic. Freeman (1991,
1996), Grogger (1995, 1998) and more recently Lochner and Moretti (2001)
attempt to clearly identify the relationships between crime and education.
Even if it appears quite reasonable to look for a relationship between crime
and level of education, very few economic works have tried to analyze this
relationship.21
Most of the contributions on the eﬀects of education on crime stress
how education raises individuals’ skills and abilities, thus increases the re-
turns to legitimate work, raising the opportunity costs of illegal behaviour.
B u tt h e r ee x i s tb e n e ﬁts from education that are not taken in account by
individuals, this implies that the social return of education is higher than
its private return. Education has an indirect (non-market) eﬀe c tt h a ta f -
fects the preferences of individuals. This eﬀect (“civilization eﬀect”) makes
criminal decision more costly in psychological terms. Thus, we focus on
these aspects trying to give a wider perspective of the relationships existing
between education and crime.
In his ﬁrst paper, Lochner (1999) asserts that “crime is primarily a prob-
lem among young uneducated men. Individuals with low skill level are more
likely to participate in criminal activities because the returns they can earn
from work or school are low. Both high school graduation and ability directly
lower criminal propensities” (p. 34).
In his analysis, he aims at showing how high school graduation substan-
tially lowers criminal participation rate even after controlling for heterogene-
i t yi na b i l i t y .T h u s ,i ft h a ts t a t e m e n ti sc o n ﬁrmed this could have important
20Wilson and Herrnstein (1985).
21Lochner, (1999); Lochner and Moretti, (2001).
18policies implications. In fact, “policies which raise the skills and abilities of
children and adolescent as well as encourage them to ﬁnish high school can
have sizeable impacts on crime” (p.34).
Similar results in tackling crime can be obtained using wage subsidies
instead of “education subsidies”, but in this case it is important to consider
the dynamic eﬀects of a policy which targets wage subsidies to younger
workers. In fact, as already underlined by Imrohoroglu et al. (2001), such a
policy can have distortionary eﬀect and discourage skill formation and raise
crime rates among older workers.
Most of previous researches on crime reduction has focused on the de-
terrent and incapacitation eﬀects of stricter law enforcement, instead this
study suggests that an optimal mix of policies aiming at increasing skill in-
vestment, legitimate earnings and work should be pursued . Enforcement,
skill investment, and wage subsidy policies are important components of an
eﬀective crime ﬁghting strategy.
This paper develops a dynamic two-period model of individual behaviour
in which adolescent and adults decide how to allocate their time between
school, work and crime. As suggested by Lochner (1999) “this paper pro-
vides a more rigorous analysis, developing a simple model that incorporates
individual decision about work, crime and education. A number of new in-
sights are derived and empirical implications are then tested using data from
various sources” (National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, Current Popula-
tion Survey and Uniform Crime Reports) (p. 1).
First, the model explains why older and more educated workers tend
to commit less of some property crimes than others. Second, the model is
useful to analyze the impact of education, training and work subsidies on
criminal behaviour. Third, unobserved age diﬀerences in on-the-job skill
investment explain why wages and crime are negatively correlated at older
ages. Fourth, the model predicts a rise in youth crime should accompany
the recent rise in returns to skill. Finally, the model suggests that law
enforcement policies increase education, training, and labour supply, while
reducing criminal activity.
In a successive paper joint with Moretti (2001), Lochner estimates “the
eﬀect of education on participation in criminal activity accounting for en-
dogeneity of schooling” (p. 1).
The key assertion of their work is that “crime is a negative externality
with enormous social costs, so if education reduces crime, then schooling may
have large social beneﬁts that are not taken into account by individuals. In
this case, the social return to education may exceed the private return”
(p. 1). The aim of this paper is to analyze whether there is a correlation
19between crime and education and to identify eﬀective policies in pursuing a
reduction in crime. In particular, given the large social costs of crime, small
reductions in crime associated with education may be economically relevant.
Lochner and Moretti (2001) argues that several reasons lead economists
to think of the role of education in combating and reducing crime rate.
We can summarize their explanations as follows: “ﬁrst, schooling in-
creases the returns to legitimate work, raising the opportunity costs of ille-
gal behaviour. Additionally, punishment for criminal behaviour often entails
incarceration. By raising wage rates, schooling makes any time spent out
of the labour market more costly. Second, schooling may directly aﬀect
the ﬁnancial or psychic rewards from crime itself. Finally, schooling may
alter preferences in indirect ways, which may aﬀect decisions to engage in
crime. For example, education may increase one’s patience (as in Becker
and Mulligan, 1997) or risk aversion” (p. 1).
They use a simple economic model of work, school, and crime, in which
maximizer individuals are assumed to choose the amount of education they
wish to acquire and the amount of time spent on work and crime once they
have ﬁnished school.
The empirical analysis of crime and education presents some diﬃculties
due to the presence of unobserved characteristics aﬀecting schooling deci-
sions that are likely to be strictly correlated with unobservable inﬂuencing
the decision to engage in crime.
In this paper the authors use three data sources: “individual-level data
from the Census on incarceration, state-level data on arrests from the Uni-
form Crime Reports, and self-report data on crime and incarceration from
the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth” (p. 2).
The results obtained using these three sets of data allow Lochner and
Moretti (2001) to conclude that “schooling signiﬁcantly reduces criminal
activity” (p. 30). It is important to stress that these ﬁndings are robust to
diﬀerent identiﬁcation strategies and measures of criminal activity.
Given the consistency and the robustness of their ﬁndings, Lochner and
Moretti (2001) conclude “that the estimated eﬀects of education on crime
cannot be easily explained away by unobserved characteristics of criminals,
unobserved state policies that aﬀect both crime and schooling, or educational
diﬀerences in the conditional probability of arrest and imprisonment given
crime. Evidence from other studies regarding the elasticity of crime with
respect to wage rates suggests that a signiﬁcant part of the measured eﬀect of
education on crime can be attributed to the increase in wages associated with
schooling....We further argue that the impact of education on crime implies
that there are beneﬁts to education not taken into account by individuals
20themselves, so the social return to schooling is larger than the private return.
The estimated social externalities from reduced crime are sizeable” (p. 31).
In particular, the economic returns from an appropriate and eﬀective
policy are massive and outstanding. In fact, “a 1% increase in the high
school completion rate of all men ages 20-60 would save the United States
as much as $1.4 billion per year in reduced costs from crime incurred by
victims and society at large. Such externalities from education amount to
$1,170-2,100 per additional high school graduate or 14-26% of the private
return to schooling” (p. 31). It appears to be socially convenient to promote
and pursue policies aimed at preventing high school drop out and increasing
schooling participation.
A very interesting paper is by David Usher (1997). He analyses the re-
lationship between education and criminal activity from a diﬀerent point of
view. In fact, he argues that education may also have a “civilization” eﬀect,
tending to reduce the incidence of criminal activity. Education conveys a
civic externality, a beneﬁtt os o c i e t yo v e ra n da b o v et h eb e n e ﬁt to the stu-
dent in enhancing his future earning power. Students are taught not only to
be productive, but to be law abiding and loyal to their country. The civic
externality is incorporated into an “anarchy” model where people choose to
be farmers or bandits, and schooling inculcates a distaste for a life of crime.
Estimates of the return to education are biased down when the civic exter-
nality is overlooked. In particular, as the author says in the introduction
to his paper, “education promotes good citizenship. Education does more
than teach skills to enhance one’s capacity to earn income. It perpetuates
the values of society, enculturates people to serve their communities, and
promotes the virtues of hard work and honesty” (p. 368).
Thus, education has a multiple role in deterring crime. In fact, as sug-
gested by Freeman (1994) and Lochner (1999) education may raise skills
and abilities and then increasing wage level and work opportunities, but at
the same time it can have a “civilization” eﬀect, as stated by Usher (1997).
Then an eﬀective and appropriate education or schooling policy can be very
useful in combating and reducing the lev e lo fc r i m eo v e r a l la n di np a r t i c u l a r
among young people.
6C r i m e a n d Y o u t h
As seen in the previous section the level of education is closely related to
crime, in particular as suggested by several studies (Wilson and Herrnstein,
1985, Freeman, 1991 and 1996, Grogger, 1991, 1995 and 1998) criminals
21tend to be less educated and from poorer economic backgrounds than oth-
ers. Moreover, young men are said to be more prone to engage in criminal
activities than the rest of the population.
Freeman, in his 1991 paper aimed at examining the magnitude of crim-
inal activity in the 1980s, documents the increasing participation of disad-
vantaged young men, in particular, less educated young blacks, in criminal
activities; he also shows that crime has long-term negative consequences for
their future possibilities of employment; and that the decision to commit
crime is economically rational only in the short run.
This category of people has massively joined criminal market because of
the huge drop in the real earnings and employment opportunities for less
educated young men over the last two decades. As stressed by Freeman
(1991) “the fall in real earnings reduced the opportunity cost of crime, and
may, have convinced many youths that they have no future in the legitimate
job market. The long term decline in the probability of employment of the
less educated is likely to have had a similar impact inducing youths into
crime” (p. 21).
As already suggested in our previous section on crime and inequality,
another potential cause for the rising participation in crime is the increased
income of the upper deciles of the income distribution and the increased
inequality in wages. According to Freeman (1991) the higher income level
of the “already rich” has had two important eﬀects on crime; ﬁrst, “the
more money in the hands of the wealthy, the more lucrative is robbery or
burglary, and the greater is the potential demand by wealthy for illegal
consumption items such as drugs” and second, “the exogenous growth of
criminal opportunities due to innovation and expansion of the drug business
is also likely to have contributed to rise in youth crime” (p. 22 ).
Freeman suggest that to improve less educated skills and to increase their
legitimate opportunities should be part of any crime reduction programs.
In a following paper, Freeman (1994) suggests that “the continued crime
high rate in the U.S., despite massive imprisonment of criminals, may be
one of the costs of the rising inequality in the country, and in particularly of
the falling real earning of the less educated” (p. 1) and “perhaps the widely
increase in earnings inequality and the fall in the real earnings of the less
skilled men who commit most crimes gave young men a job market push
into crime”(p. 1).22
22It is worth to notice that a reduction in real wages earned by less skilled men implies
a increase in wage inequality, but an increase in wage inequality not necessarily implies
a reduction in wages earned by less skilled men. The increase in inequality may be due
to an increase in wages earned by more skilled men (Katz and Murphy (1992); Juhn et
22Youth participation to crime and the reasons that induce youth to enter
the illegal activities market are also the topic of Grogger’s paper (1998). In
fact, in order to study the eﬀect of market wages on youth crime, Grogger
proposes a time-allocation model in which agents face a parametric wage and
diminishing marginal returns to crime. Agents decide how much crime to
commit and how much to work on the legitimate market on the basis of their
returns from crime and their legal wages. As done in several other papers,
the author considers agents to be amoral in the sense that committing crime
causes no more disutility than working.
By estimating the model for the U.S., using data from National Longi-
tudinal Survey Youth Cohort for 1980, Grogger identiﬁes the determinants
of criminal returns and of the wage responsiveness of criminal participation.
In particular, youths’ behaviour appears to be very responsive to price in-
centives. Thus, falling real wages have been an important determinant of
rising youth crime over the past twenty years. Furthermore, as underlined
by the author “wages explain an important component of the racial diﬀeren-
tial in criminal participation, and they largely explain the age distribution
of crime” (p. 1).
It appears crucial to properly understand the relationships existing be-
tween wages, youth and crime in order to promote and pursuing feasible
policies in tackling crime. The main goal of Grogger’s “paper is to esti-
mate the eﬀect of the market wages on youth crime and determine whether
wages can explain the recent trend in crime and its distribution by race and
age”, focusing“exclusivelyonpropertycrimes, ..., crimesfromwhichthe
perpetrator may acquire income”.
In particular the author determines some relevant determinants of youth
crime and possible explanations for the increasing crime rate across young
people.
We have already discussed, in particular in the previous section, but also
in the present one the reasons of the decline in the real wages over the past
two decades, especially for young, unskilled and uneducated men (Katz and
Murphy, 1992; Juhn, Murphy and Pierce, 1993; Freeman, 1991 and 1994).
Over the same period, youth arrest rates have risen substantially, as also
presented by Imrohoroglu, Merlo and Rupert (2001).
Moreover, Grogger (1998) shows that the reason why blacks participate
in crime at a much greater rate than whites can be found in the wage
al. (1993)). Implications are radically diﬀerent. In fact, in the ﬁr s tc a s ei ti sl e s sw o r t h
staying in the legal sector, while in the second case crime returns increase. This second
eﬀect may be lower than the ﬁrst one, because it not directly aﬀect the individual who
may decide to enter the crime market.
23diﬀerential between blacks and whites. (If crime is responsive to wages,
then black-white gap may explain part of the black-white diﬀerence in crime
rates.)
Finally, criminal activities typically increase with age until the late teens
and then declines. This relationship appears to be quite robust, and justiﬁed
by the fact that wage represent the opportunity cost of committing crime,
and rise steeply with age during the early part of one’s career.
7 Crime and Social Interactions
In this section we review the literature documenting the importance of social
factors in explaining the level of crime. In fact, social factors, social interac-
tions and social networks23 appear to be strongly correlated with propensity
to crime.
Criminal activity may be contagious in high-crime areas because the so-
cial penalties for committing crime or the probability of arrest may be lower
than in other neighbourhoods, as may be the costs of acquiring important
“inputs” for crime.
Neighbourhood poverty may also aﬀect the actual or perceived returns to
schooling and work by aﬀecting access to quality schools, which may depress
the opportunity cost of crime.
Some studies24 suggest that children who grow up in “bad neighbour-
hoods” tend to have worse outcomes on a range of social indicators. They
accumulate less human capital, drop out of school earlier and have a higher
risk of involvement in criminal activity. Young women are more likely to get
pregnant in their teenage years, and tend to form single parent household
after the birth of their child. Furthermore, the fact that neighbourhood
characteristics appear to be related to individual behaviour may result from
the tendency of families with similar characteristics to live close to each
other.
In others words, individuals are aﬀected in taking their decisions by peer
group components (i.e. relatives, parents, schoolmates, neighbourhood) and
by their socioeconomic background .
Starting from the fact that the rate of unemployment has sharply in-
creased for disadvantaged and less-educated youths and that poverty rate
among families headed by young persons has increased since the early 70s,
Case and Katz (1991) examine the eﬀects of family background and neigh-
23Calvó-Armengol and Zenou, (2003).
24Glaeser et al., (1996); Case and Katz, (1991); Ludwig et. al, (2000).
24bourhood peers on the behaviours of youth living in low-income Boston
neighbourhoods.
Using data from the NBER survey of youths aged 17 to 24 from high-
poverty neighbourhoods in inner-city Boston in early 1989, they conduct an
interesting econometric analysis that allows them to conclude that “family
adult behaviours are strongly related to analogous youth behaviours. The
links between the behaviour of older family members and youth are im-
portant for criminal activity, drug and alcohol use,..., schooling...”. (p.1)
They “also ﬁnd that the behaviours of neighbourhood peers appear to sub-
stantially aﬀectyouthbehaviour...Residenceinaneighbourhoodinwhich
a large proportion of other youths are involved in crime is associated with
a substantial increase in an individual’s probability of the being involved in
crime. Signiﬁcant neighbourhood peer eﬀect are also apparent from drug
and alcohol use,..., and the propensity of youths to be out of school and
out of work”. (p. 1)
Family background and neighbourhood peers are strongly related with
the decisions of youth. Disadvantaged youths, living in suburb or high-
poverty or high-crime areas, are more likely to imitate bad attitudes of
their parents and neighbours. Then it appears to be crucial an eﬀective
policy (i.e. schooling, education,...) aimed at giving diﬀerent perspectives
to disadvantaged youths. In fact, education may provide an alternative
source of information about the returns from criminal actions and parents
or positive example may send messages that interrupt the messages from
one’s neighbours (Glaeser et al., 1996).
In a recent paper, Ludwig et. al (2000), using data generated by a
randomized housing-mobility experiment conducted on 638 families from
high-poverty Baltimore neighbourhoods, study the eﬀects of relocating fam-
ilies from high- to low poverty neighbourhoods on juvenile crime. The au-
thors try to ﬁnd an empirical support to the possibility “that the volume of
crime...may be related in part to the spatial concentration of low-income
families in high-poverty, high-crime urban neighbourhoods” (p. 1). In other
words “criminal activity may be contagious in high-crime areas because the
social penalties for committing crime or the probability of arrest may be
lower than in other neighbourhoods, as may be the costs of acquiring an
important input for crime” (p.1) and furthermore neighbourhood poverty
may also aﬀect the actual or perceived returns to schooling and work by
aﬀecting access to quality schools, which may depress the opportunity cost
of crime.
Ludwig et al. (2000) determine that the oﬀer to relocate families from
high- to low poverty neighbourhoods reduces juvenile arrest and violent
25criminal behaviours by teens on the order of 30 to 50 percent.
Ad i ﬀerent approach is followed by Glaeser et al. (1996). Given the high
degree of variance of crime across space, they try to determine which can be
the reasons of this puzzle, supported by their empirical work that strongly
suggests that the variance is not the result of geographical attributes. The
aim of the paper is to measure the presence of social interactions and their
inﬂuence on crime.
They present two models populated by two diﬀerent classes of agents: a)
agents who inﬂuence and are inﬂuenced by their neighbours and b) agents
who inﬂuence their neighbours, but who are not themselves inﬂuenceable
(“ﬁxed agents”).
The so called “ﬁxed agents” can be interpreted, following the authors,
in diﬀerent ways: “1) the expected distance between two ﬁx e da g e n t si st h e
expected size of a group with positive social interactions...2)agentswhodo
not observe their neighbours action...3) metaphor for the forces that slow
social interaction (i.e. strong parents, formal schooling)”.
The model provides a natural index of social interactions derived from
t h ep r e s e n c eo f“ ﬁxed” agents which can compare the degree of social inter-
actions across crimes, across geographic units and across time.
The results obtained are “similar for diﬀerent data samples and suggests
that the amount of social interactions are highest in petty crimes (such as
larceny and auto theft), moderate in more serious crime (assault, burglary
and robbery) and almost negligible in murder and rape. The index of social
interactions is also applied to non-criminal choices and we ﬁnd that there is
substantial interaction in schooling choice” (p. 1).
In a more recent paper by Glaeser and Sacerdote (1999), the authors
attempt to explain why crime rate is much higher in big cities than in either
small cities or rural areas. They decomposed the relationship between cities
and crime in four category: 1) higher pecuniary returns to crime in urban
areas, 2) lower probability of arrest, 3) characteristics exogenous with respect
to location, 4) characteristic endogenous with respect to location. Using
data from the National Crime Victimization Survey they empirically test
their hypothesis they ﬁnd that: 45% of this connection can be explained by
the fact that families are much less intact in cities; 26% by higher beneﬁt
levels in cities and 12% by lower probability of arrest. Thus, this study
conﬁrm how family background and neighbourhood peers play a main role
in criminal behaviour.
268C o n c l u s i o n s
Starting from the most important and ﬁrst contribution to the economics
of crime we have presented and discussed both empirical and theoretical
contributions.
Our review of the literature presents an “historical” part in which we
stress the theoretical framework of the economics of crime and propose the
milestone represented by Becker’s seminal paper and the following contribu-
tion and extension of Becker’s original idea. In particular, the Becker’s paper
radically changes the way of thinking about criminal behaviour contributing
to look at the criminal choice as a maximization problem in which agents
have to compare costs and beneﬁts of legal and illegal activities taking in
account the probability of being arrested and punished and the expected
returns from crime. Thus, criminal decision is determined by an economic
analysis of agents.
Since the beginning of 80s, Becker’s paper open the door to a new ﬁeld of
empirical research whose main purpose is to verify and study the economic
variables that determine criminal choices and behaviours of agents.
The papers presented and discussed permit to deduce that criminal be-
haviour is inﬂuenced by some speciﬁc factors: probability of punishment
and apprehension, deterrence, diﬀerential wages between legal and illegal
activities, wage inequality, level of education, unemployment, cultural and
family background and other economic and social factors that may aﬀect
individual’s propensity to commit crimes such as cultural characteristics,
age and sex.
The economics of crime is closely related and interacts with diﬀerent and
heterogeneous ﬁelds (i.e. sociology, criminology, psychiatry and geography).
In particular, we focus our attention on social and socioeconomic de-
terminants such as unemployment, education, inequality, social networks,
socioeconomic background and age, presenting both empirical and theo-
retical recent contributions. This allows us to conclude that the criminal
phenomenon is a complex phenomenon that is strongly related and aﬀected
by several socioeconomic determinants whose relationships with crime have
t ob ek n o w ni no r d e rt od e s i g na n dt oi m p l e m e n te ﬀective and adequate
policies in reducing crime.
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